

#### Readings for This Lecture

#### • Wikipedia


- HTTP Cookie
- <u>Same Origin Policy</u>
- Cross Site Scripting
- <u>Cross Site Request Forgery</u>



#### Background

- Many sensitive tasks are done through web
  - Online banking, online shopping
  - Database access
  - System administration
- Web applications and web users are targets of many attacks
  - Cross site scripting
  - SQL injection
  - Cross site request forgery
  - Information leakage
  - Session hijacking

#### Web Browser and Network



- Browser sends requests
- Web site sends response pages, which may include code
- Interaction susceptible to network attacks

#### Web Security Issues

- Secure communications between client & server – HTTPS (HTTP over SSL)
- User authentication & session management
   Cookies & other methods
- Active contents from different websites
  - Protecting resources maintained by browsers
- Web application security
- Web site authentication (e.g., anti-phishing)
- Privacy concerns


#### HTTP: HyperText Transfer Protocol

- Browser sends HTTP requests to the server
  - Methods: GET, POST, HEAD, ...
  - GET: to retrieve a resource (html, image, script, css,...)
  - POST: to submit a form (login, register, ...)
  - HEAD
- Server replies with a HTTP response
- Stateless request/response protocol
  - Each request is independent of previous requests
  - Statelessness has a significant impact on design and implementation of applications

#### Use Cookies to Store State Info

#### Cookies

 A cookie is a name/value pair created by a website to store information on your computer



#### **Cookies Fields**

- An example cookie
  - Name session-token

.amazon.com

- Content "s7yZiOvFm4YymG...."
- Domain
- Path
- Send For
- Expires

/ Any type of connection Monday, September 08, 2031 7:19:41 PM

#### Cookies

- Stored by the browser
- Used by the web applications
  - used for authenticating, tracking, and maintaining specific information about users
    - e.g., site preferences, contents of shopping carts
  - data may be sensitive
  - may be used to gather information about specific users
- Cookie ownership
  - Once a cookie is saved on your computer, only the website that created the cookie can read it


#### Web Authentication via Cookies

#### HTTP is stateless

– How does the server recognize a user who has signed in?

- Servers can use cookies to store state on client
  - After client successfully authenticates, server computes an authenticator and gives it to browser in a cookie
    - Client cannot forge authenticator on his own (session id)
  - With each request, browser presents the cookie
  - Server verifies the authenticator

# A Typical Session with Cookies



Authenticators must be unforgeable and tamper-proof (malicious clients shouldn't be able to modify an existing authenticator) How to design it?

# Cross Site Scripting

# **Client Side Scripting**

- Web pages (HTML) can embed dynamic contents (code) that can executed on the browser
- JavaScript
  - embedded in web pages and executed inside browser
- VBScript
  - similar to JavaScript, only for Windows
- Java applets
  - small pieces of Java bytecodes that execute in browsers

#### HTML and Scripting

<html>

. . .

<P>

Browser receives content, displays HTML and executes scripts

```
<script>
```

```
var num1, num2, sum
num1 = prompt("Enter first number")
num2 = prompt("Enter second number")
sum = parseInt(num1) + parseInt(num2)
alert("Sum = " + sum)
</script>
```

</html>

#### Scripts are Powerful

- Client-side scripting is powerful and flexible, and can access the following resources
  - Local files on the client-side host
    - read / write local files
  - Webpage resources maintained by the browser
    - Cookies
    - Domain Object Model (DOM) objects
      - steal private information
      - control what users see
      - impersonate the user

# Browser as an Operating System

- Web users visit multiple websites simultaneously
- A browser serves web pages (which may contain programs) from different web domains
  - i.e., a browser runs programs provided by mutually untrusted entities
  - Running code one does not know/trust is dangerous
  - A browser also maintains resources created/updated by web domains
- Browser must confine (sandbox) these scripts so that they cannot access arbitrary local resources
- Browser must have a security policy to manage/protect browser-maintained resources and to provide separation among mutually untrusted scripts

#### Same Origin Policy

- The basic security model enforced in the browser
- SoP isolates the scripts and resources downloaded from different origins
  - E.g., evil.org scripts cannot access bank.com resources
- Use origin as the security principal
- Origin = domain name + protocol + port
  - all three must be equal for origin to be considered the same

# Security Principals

- A **security principal** is an entity that can be authenticated by a computer system or network.
  - Security principals, in addition to being able to be authenticated, are typically capable of being assigned rights and privileges over resources in the network.
- Unit to which information security policies can apply.
- Not to be confused with security principles.
- Choosing the right security principal is important.
- What are security principals in Unix?

#### Same Original Policy: What it Controls

- Same-origin policy applies to the following accesses:
  - manipulating browser windows
  - URLs requested via the XmlHttpRequest
    - XmlHttpRequest is an API that can be used by web browser scripting languages to transfer XML and other text data to and from a web server using HTTP, by establishing an independent and asynchronous communication channel.
      - used by AJAX
  - manipulating frames (including inline frames)
  - manipulating documents (included using the object tag)
  - manipulating cookies

# Problems with S-O Policy

- Poorly enforced on some browsers
  - Particularly older browsers
- Limitations if site hosts unrelated pages
  - Example: Web server often hosts sites for unrelated parties
    - http://www.example.com/account/
    - http://www.example.com/otheraccount/
  - Same-origin policy allows script on one page to access properties of document from another
- Can be bypassed in Cross-Site-Scripting attacks
- Usability: Sometimes prevents desirable cross-origin resource sharing

# Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

- Recall the basics
  - scripts embedded in web pages run in browsers
  - scripts can access cookies
    - get private information
  - and manipulate DOM objects
    - controls what users see
  - scripts controlled by the same-origin policy
- Why would XSS occur
  - Web applications often take user inputs and use them as part of webpage (these inputs can have scripts)

# How XSS Works on Online Blog

- Everyone can post comments, which will be displayed to everyone who view the post
- Attacker posts a malicious comment that includes scripts (which reads local authentication credentials and send of to the attacker)
- Anyone who view the post can have local authentication cookies stolen
- Web apps will check that posts do not include scripts, but the check sometimes fail.
- Bug in the web application. Attack happens in browser.

#### Effect of the Attack

Attacker can execute arbitrary scripts in browser

- Can manipulate any DOM component on victim.com
  - Control links on page
  - Control form fields (e.g. password field) on this page and linked pages.
- Can infect other users: MySpace.com worm.

#### MySpace.com (Samy worm)

- Users can post HTML on their pages
  - MySpace.com ensures HTML contains no <script>, <body>, onclick, <a href=javascript://>
  - However, attacker find out that a way to include Javascript within CSS tags:

<div style="background:url(`javascript:alert(1)')">

And can hide "javascript" as "java\nscript"

- With careful javascript hacking:
  - Samy's worm: infects anyone who visits an infected MySpace page ... and adds Samy as a friend.
  - Samy had millions of friends within 24 hours.
- More info: http://namb.la/popular/tech.html

# Avoiding XSS bugs (PHP)

- Main problem:
  - Input checking is difficult --- many ways to inject scripts into HTML.
- Preprocess input from user before echoing it
- PHP: htmlspecialchars(string)
  - $\& \rightarrow \& " \rightarrow \" ' \rightarrow \'$  $< \rightarrow \&lt; > \rightarrow \&gt;$
  - htmlspecialchars(

"<a href='test'>Test</a>", ENT\_QUOTES);

Outputs:

<a href=&#039;test&#039;&gt;Test&lt;/a&gt;

#### Avoiding XSS bugs (ASP.NET)

#### • ASP.NET 1.1:

#### – Server.HtmlEncode(string)

- Similar to PHP htmlspecialchars
- validateRequest: (on by default)
  - Crashes page if finds <script> in POST data.
  - Looks for hardcoded list of patterns.
  - Can be disabled:

<%@ Page validateRequest="false" %>

# Cross site request forgery

#### Cross site request forgery (abbrev. CSRF or XSRF)

- Also known as one click attack or session riding
- Transmits unauthorized commands from a user who has logged in to a website to the website.

#### **CSRF** Explained

Example:

- User logs in to bank.com. Forgets to sign off.
- Session cookie remains in browser state

Then user visits another site containing:

<form name=F action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php>

<input name=recipient value=badguy> ...

<script> document.F.submit(); </script>

- Browser sends user auth cookie with request
  - Transaction will be fulfilled
- <u>Problem</u>:
  - browser is a confused deputy

#### GMail Incidence: Jan 2007

- Google docs has a script that run a callback function, passing it your contact list as an object. The script presumably checks a cookie to ensure you are logged into a Google account before handing over the list.
- Unfortunately, it doesn't check what page is making the request. So, if you are logged in on window 1, window 2 (an evil site) can make the function call and get the contact list as an object. Since you are logged in somewhere, your cookie is valid and the request goes through.

# Real World CSRF Vulnerabilities

- Gmail
- NY Times
- ING Direct (4<sup>th</sup> largest saving bank in US)
- YouTube
- Various DSL Routers
- Purdue WebMail
- PEFCU
- Purdue CS Portal

#### Prevention

- Server side:
  - use cookie + hidden fields to authenticate
    - hidden fields values need to be unpredictable and userspecific
  - requires the body of the POST request to contain cookies
- User side:
  - logging off one site before using others
  - selective sending of authentication tokens with requests

#### Coming Attractions ...

#### More Web Security Issues

- SQL injection
- Side channel information leakage
- Driveby downloads
- Browser extension security
- Cookie privacy issues

